Busan’s Real Estate ‘Crisis’? Maybe It’s Just Bad Journalism
Local headlines in Busan keep repeating the same alarm: too few apartments, not enough time. But this narrative often reflects developer data, not resident realities—raising questions about who frames urban issues, and why.
BUSAN, South Korea — In Busan, headlines about an impending housing shortage have become an annual tradition. Local media warn of a “supply cliff” in the apartment market, pointing to declining construction starts, lagging permit approvals, and a shrinking pipeline of new residential units. Last year’s housing start figures hit a decade low—just 16,707 new units began construction, less than half the peak in 2017. Real estate experts caution that if this trend continues, Busan could face an acute undersupply within three to four years, straining housing affordability and pushing buyers and renters into crisis. At first glance, the numbers seem to paint a clear picture: too few homes, too little time.
But a deeper look reveals a more complicated story. While construction may be slowing, the fundamentals of demand are also shifting—and not in ways that align with the supply-side panic. Since 2019, Busan has lost more than 150,000 residents, part of a long-term demographic trend driven by low birthrates, outmigration of younger people, and an aging population. Yet during this same period, the number of households has increased from 1.37 million to over 1.46 million, a 6.5 percent rise that reflects a national trend: more people living alone or in smaller units, and fewer traditional family households. This apparent contradiction—shrinking population, growing household count—has become a defining feature of urban Korea. But it also means that housing needs are more diverse and more fragmented than ever before.
The problem isn’t simply that there aren’t enough homes; it’s that the homes being built increasingly do not match the types of residents who remain. New construction continues to favor large, high-end units geared toward multi-person families, even as those households become rarer. In districts like Suyeong and Dongnae, prized for their schools and amenities, there are no new apartment completions scheduled for this year, despite clear resident demand. Meanwhile, new high-rise developments in outlying areas are struggling to attract buyers. In some neighborhoods, vacancy rates in recently built apartments are creeping upward—a sign that the market is not in shortage, but in mismatch.
This mismatch is compounded by the way public land and underutilized urban spaces are being repurposed. In the past decade, Busan has converted dozens of former public or commercial sites—department stores, large marts, even the city’s South Driver’s License Test Center—into new housing developments. Plans are now under consideration to turn that test center, located in a high-density residential zone, into yet another mixed-use apartment complex, despite its potential value as a public facility or civic amenity. The same cycle plays out repeatedly: a large site becomes vacant, it is deemed too valuable to “waste” on non-residential use, and housing towers rise in its place. What this approach gains in speed and revenue, it loses in diversity and long-term urban balance.
What’s emerging is a city increasingly dominated by one use—residential—at the expense of others. As apartment blocks fill former public spaces, Busan is losing the very elements that make a city livable: green space, cultural venues, small-scale commerce, and civic gathering places. Even as rooftops proliferate, everyday life becomes more fragmented, less connected. Neighborhoods become bedrooms rather than communities. When housing becomes the sole development goal, the result is not just architectural uniformity, but social erosion.
Despite this, the media narrative remains tightly coupled to construction metrics. Articles on housing shortages often cite data and statements from developers, construction associations, or the real estate industry—rarely questioning whether the homes being built are suited to actual demand. There is limited coverage of vacancy trends, demographic change, or affordability pressure. Even fewer stories investigate whether current development patterns support long-term economic resilience or urban inclusivity. In this context, the term “supply cliff” functions more as a rhetorical device than a reflection of lived experience.
Other cities offer a contrast. In places like Copenhagen, Melbourne, and Barcelona, housing policy is increasingly shaped by considerations of livability, mixed-use development, and long-term demographic trends. These cities encourage adaptive reuse of aging commercial stock, prioritize affordable rental housing for young and elderly residents, and impose requirements that new developments include non-residential components such as retail, schools, or community centers. Such models recognize that housing alone cannot sustain a city—people also need places to work, study, socialize, and access public services.
Busan’s opportunity lies in rethinking what kind of urban future it wants to build. The issue is not whether apartments should be built, but what kind of city all those apartments will create. That means asking harder questions about who current housing policy serves, what is being lost in the rush to develop, and whether future generations will inherit a city that works for more than just developers and landlords. Planning decisions must move beyond units-per-year and square meters-per-tower. They must embrace a broader vision of urban life that values sustainability, accessibility, and equity.
The danger isn’t that Busan will fail to build enough homes. The danger is that it will build the wrong kind—too many, too large, too expensive, and too far removed from the people who actually live there. Cities are not just places to live. They are places to belong. And that kind of city can’t be built with blueprints and cranes alone.
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